From 72f5c8e48a09ab09dae91c869e53e3d0c75ef921 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ken Zalewski <ken.zalewski@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Jul 2024 12:19:50 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Patch to openssl-1.1.1za.  This version addresses one
 vulnerability:  CVE-2024-5535

---
 include/openssl/opensslv.h |  4 +--
 ssl/ssl_lib.c              | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/openssl/opensslv.h b/include/openssl/opensslv.h
index 585109a..a1a5d07 100644
--- a/include/openssl/opensslv.h
+++ b/include/openssl/opensslv.h
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1010119fL
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.1.1y  27 May 2024"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x101011afL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.1.1za  26 Jun 2024"
 
 /*-
  * The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...)
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 356d65c..ccb1d4a 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -2761,37 +2761,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
                           unsigned int server_len,
                           const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
 {
-    unsigned int i, j;
-    const unsigned char *result;
-    int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+    PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
+
+    if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
+            || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
+            || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
+        *out = NULL;
+        *outlen = 0;
+        return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
+     * a match.
+     */
+    *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
+    *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
 
     /*
      * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
      */
-    for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
-        for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
-            if (server[i] == client[j] &&
-                memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
-                /* We found a match */
-                result = &server[i];
-                status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
-                goto found;
+    if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
+        while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
+            if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
+                continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
+            if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
+                while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
+                    if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
+                                     PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
+                        /* We found a match */
+                        *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
+                        *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
+                        return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+                    }
+                }
+                /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
+            } else {
+                /* This should never happen */
+                return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
             }
-            j += client[j];
-            j++;
         }
-        i += server[i];
-        i++;
+        /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
     }
 
-    /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
-    result = client;
-    status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
-
- found:
-    *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
-    *outlen = result[0];
-    return status;
+    /*
+     * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
+     * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
+     */
+    return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
 }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG